Beck v. J.J.A. Holding Corp.

The second case dealing with mold was Beck v. J.J.A. Holding Corp. On September 7, 1998, Catherine Beck’s apartment was flooded, severely damaging its flooring and walls. At her request, the defendant landlord repainted the apartment, and Beck replaced the carpeting. Beck alleged that, thereafter, as a result of the flooding, hazardous mold contaminated her apartment. She asserted that, because the landlord failed to timely remedy the unsafe condition, she contracted a bronchial infection and, eventually, chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder. She claimed that because a dangerous accumulation of mold spores is a foreseeable consequence of water seeping into walls, her landlord was negligent and breached its duty to maintain the premises in a safe condition by failing to abate the mold, causing damage to her health, safety, and life.

The landlord denied any liability. In moving for summary judgment, the landlord argued that it did not create the condition and had no actual or constructive notice of it prior to November 1999. The landlord also asserted that, in any event, it did not have sufficient time to remedy the hazard before Beck moved out of the apartment in December 1999.

Specifically, the landlord stated: “Plaintiff can offer no evidence as to the length of time the alleged mold condition was present in her apartment. The first, and only, piece of evidence regarding the presence of mold is a report from Johns Hopkins, dated November 16, 1999, less than a month before plaintiff moved out of the apartment, but over a year after the time of the flood.”

The landlord stated that Beck testified at her deposition that she was not aware of the elevated mold levels until November 1999 when she received the Johns Hopkins report.

In opposition to the landlord’s motion, Beck asserted that after her landlord repainted her apartment, she noticed brown spots on the walls, and that her apartment had a moldy odor. She alleged that the discoloration of the walls, along with the knowledge of the water damage, should have placed the landlord on notice of the likelihood of the mold growth in the apartment. She also annexed EPA publications indicating that water damage is likely to cause mold, and her medical reports, all dated after December 1999, which detailed her respiratory problems.

In reply, the landlord reiterated that Beck had not set forth a prima facie case of negligence because she had not presented evidence that the landlord had actual or constructive notice of the mold hazard. The trial court dismissed Beck’s common-law negligence claim, finding that “[t]here is no support in law for plaintiff’s theory that the landlord essentially had an ongoing duty to monitor plaintiff’s apartment for the possible development of environmental hazards.”

The appellate court affirmed the decision. It said that a landlord has a duty to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition under the existing circumstances. For a plaintiff to show a breach of that duty, Beck was required to first establish that the landlord either created or had actual or constructive notice of the hazardous condition that precipitated an injury.

On this motion for summary judgment, the landlord had asserted that it was first notified of the hazardous mold condition in November 1999. That was the same month that Beck became aware of the problem, and a month prior to the time plaintiff moved out of the apartment. Thus, in opposition to the landlord’s motion, the court said that it was incumbent upon Beck to show that the landlord either created, or had actual or constructive notice of, the mold hazard. Having failed to meet this burden, or to have established any other act or omission on the landlord’s part that could have been considered a proximate cause of her respiratory ailments, it was the appellate court’s view that the trial court appropriately dismissed Beck’s claim for common-law negligence.